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Informed consent in research ethics: An analysis from the perspective of 
ǯ 
 
Abstract. 
We explore the origins and dynamics of ethical communication with reference to 
the requirements for informed consent provision in research ethics. We adopt 
the analytical framework developed in Lǯ to 
illustrate how ethical communication about informed consent has developed in 
the medical, legal and scientific systems. We would like to suggest that the 
development of ethical communication is the result of the developing semantics 
of individuality and personhood. Our analysis adds specific observations about 
how communication about research ethics, and informed consent specifically, 
reduces complexity in an increasingly functionally differentiated society.  
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Introduction  
Wǯ
communication, which ǲions under which esteem and 
disesteem can be ǳȋǡ ? ? ? ?Ǣ 29), can help us 
understand the dynamics of research ethics with specific reference to informed 
consent.   In taking the example of informed consent we do so in recognition that 
it is widely seen as fundamental to medical and research ethics.  Respect for 
autonomy is the most frequently mentioned moral principle when it comes to a 
discussion on informed consent (Faden & Beauchamp 1986).  It is rooted in the 
liberal Western tradition which emphasises the importance of individual 
freedom and choice. The most cited definition of autonomy, a contested term in 
its own right, follows Kant (Kant, 1953).  For Kant, autonomy means self-
regulation, and involves acting in accordance with ǯǤ Autonomous 
people are ends in themselves, possess an intrinsic value, and determine their 
own destiny. Respect for autonomy is regulated through informed consent ǮǯǮǯȋǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
 
This concept of informed consent generally is not without criticisms. For 
example, concerns are raised by Corrigan (2003) who argues the concept of 
consent iǮǯ
information to the conscious decision whether to participate.  Such a process 
does not, for example, recognise that autonomy is not so much an idea or concept, 
but a set of practices: Ǯǡǥǡǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
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The difficulties raised in these critiques pose interesting questions about the 
development of the concept of informed consent and its elevation to a 
fundamental condition for the treatment or inclusion of human subjects.  In what 
follows we aim to explore the evolution of informed consent using the work of 
Luhmann, specifically his theory of ethics and his historical analysis of the 
development of language in society.  We refer to some ǯ
texts in this process, but essentially, we are interpreting his ideas and using the 
work of other key commentators ǯ
social systems. In order to achieve our aims we take key events in the medical, 
legal and scientific systems which suggest that the development of consent has 
much to do with the increasing functional differentiation of society.  Throughout 
this paper we refer to and define key terms.  As such, it is first necessary to 
outline briefly what Luhmann means when he discusses ethics and the 
distinction between ethics and morals.  
 
Luhmann: distinguishing morals from ethics 
In discussing morals Luhmann starts with Durkheim; moral observations 
presuppose a distinction between rules and actions (Luhmann, 1996) which in 
turn are dependent upon an empirical reference and for Luhmann the empirical 
frame of reference is communication and not consciousness. Durkheim and 
others would assume that the distinction between good and bad would be a good 
distinction.  However, Luhmann argues that moral communication is framed 
with a binary code which opposes positive and negative value and is invariant.  It 
also does not contain any information about what is good and what is bad and 
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the values are interchangeable (for example an evil act may also be a good act 
under different conditions).  Therefore, the moral needs criteria to decide which 
behavior is good and which is bad.  
 
Criteria, or programmes, are variable and change historically. Following the 
decline in religious morality modern society is marked by the individualisation 
of moral reference, by an emphasis upon inner conviction and self-motivation 
rather than external coercion.  And whilst nobody can avoid the moral 
implication of her statement we can choose the programmes that favor our own ǤǡǮǯest suited to moral descriptors 
and are stable because they are ambivalent.  Luhmann argues they are a ǮǯǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ȍ 
 
So the moral is a specific distinction with two sides: good and bad.  Such an 
opposition can never be reduced to a unity except in the form of a paradox 
(Luhmann 1993).  As a paradox, the solution to the problem would cancel the 
problem and eliminate the distinction between the problem and its solution and 
bring moral communication to an end.  Therefore, argues Ǯ
problem for what can be called self-Ǯǯ
communication.  Furthermore, if we want to have reasons why the problem 
cannot be solved, we have to observe its carefully hidden source Ȃ ǯ
(Luhmann 1996 pg 33) 
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Decisions between conflicts in values when they do occur, and Luhmann argues 
that they only occur in the event of a conflict, are made in subsystems or by 
individuals on an ad hoc basis.  This does not mean that the moralization of 
communications is arbitrary.  There are structurally determined occasions for 
moralization, but eǮǯȋLuhmann 2012 pg 244) which emerges when urgent social problems 
arise which cannot obviously be solved through symbolically generalized 
communication media and the corresponding functional systems.  Therefore, Ǯ
realitiǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?), which cannot be overcome through other 
processes.  The code of moral communications, in terms of rules or programmes, Ǯlonger amenable to consensus.  Therefore, morality takes on Ǯǯǡ-generating traits: it arises from conflicts and encourages ǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
 
Most social systems do not need to communicate morally, in part, because moral 
distinctions, good/evil, do not correspond to any of the basic codes of function 
systems (for example true/false). Social systems do not need to communicate 
morally because the subjective moral distinctions, good/evil does not provide 
the kind of certainty that is necessary for these systems to perform their function 
which is enabling the transmission of meaning through communication. Rather 
they use codes, such as lawful/unlawful (the legal system), well/sick (medical 
system), power/no power (political system), and true/false (science system).  Ǯǯ
communications can invoke moral codes to justify decisions.  From this 
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perspective morality is understood in connection with the operations of 
communication systems and is a particular type of communication for 
processing information on esteem or disesteem.  Once engaged in moral 
communication one automatically identifies with the positive side of the 
esteem/disesteem distinction.  
 
Ethics, on the other hand, is distinct from morals and speaks to an illusion that 
there are rules for dealing with scandals and suggests Ǯǯ
(Luhmann 2012 pg 245).  
 
Ethics was a response to increasing social complexity produced by functional 
differentiation (Luhmann 1996).  It is an academic discipline concerned with 
laying the foundation for moral judgements with the assistance of theoretical 
constructs, for example utilitarianism and value ethics.  It can refer to different 
things according to Luhmann, for example, in the old European tradition, the 
isǮǡǡǯȋLuhmann 1992 pg 1007).  Since the ǡǮȋȌ
cǯǤng the eighteenth-century ethics was reformulated as a theory of 
the rational foundation of moral judgements.  
 
The important point for ethics, argues, Luhmann is that they do not analyse the 
moral externally but operate as a ǢǮthics engages itself 
for the good, opts against the bad, and hence views itself as licensed to hold the ǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡ
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hand, does not differ from other forms of communication by referring to a 
certain set of principles.  Morality is not the application of rules that are justified 
by reason, it is not a norm, but is a coding based upon the difference between 
respect and disrespect and which regulates the corresponding practices. In other 
words, there is not intrinsic moral quality and no good or bad people, only the 
possibility of indicating people as good or bad.  
 
Tǯ
the concept of informed consent we need to also understand what he meant by 
communication and social semantics.  It is to a description of these concepts that 
we now turn.   
 
Luhmann and social semantics 
Modern society, argues Luhman, is characterized by operatively closed and 
functionally distinct sub-systems, such as law, science, education, health.  
Systems are, ǯ, autopoietic, which means that their 
reproduction and perpetuity is sustained by their own internal operations 
through which they reduce the complexity of their environment. The process of Ǯǡǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌǤ Boundaries are generated by a Ǯ-
referring network of communications on the inside, and everything else ȋȌǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ȍ. For 
Luhmann communication is understood as the basic unit of social systems. 
Communication consists of information, message and understanding and is an 
occurrence, specific to a particular system, at a particular moment, which 
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generates meaning.  Most importantly, it does not concern individuals.  As 
Luhmann argues:   ǮǮǯing. In fact there is nothing in 
the unity of an object that corresponds to the word. Words such as ǮǯǡǮǯǡǮǯǡǮǯǮǯ
than what they effect in communication (Luhmann 2002 pg 182).  
 
So, communication is a basic unit of social systems and systems generate 
communication according to their codes of self-reference. When communications 
are preserved they subsequently act to enable further communication about the 
problem being referenced.  Science, for example, is ordered by a coding of ȀǤǡǮǥ
but the achievement of an observational designationǯ (Luhmann 1994 pg 12). If 
communications link around establishing whether something is an illness or a 
health condition they have meaning for the medical system. If they link around 
whether something is legal or illegal they relate to the legal system. When a 
communication occurs the reference problems which form the background to Ǯǳ(Gibson and Paul, 2014).  Communication facilitates the production 
of meaning by reducing complexity and contingency (Luhmann 1996).   
 
Semantics are understood as accumulated and condensed forms of meaning that 
are made available for us to draw on at any time when we seek to communicate 
(Andersen, 2003).  They are compressions of communication whose meaning is 
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confirmed and enriched by repeated use.  They are established over long periods 
of time when one communication links to another leading to the repetition and 
condensation of meaning around key distinctions that help organize 
communication about particular reference problems in society.  When they are 
preserved they subsequently act to enable further communication about the 
problem being referenced.  For example, if communications link around health 
and illness they have meaning for medical systems.  If they are legal 
communications they have meaning for the legal system.  Semantics is the 
understanding ǮǯǮǯ and can be both common semantics and Ǯǯ and are expressions of the semantics of a society. So whilst 
social semantics and social systems resonate with each other there is no strict 
causal relationship. 
 
Applying these ideas to the problems associated with ethical communication in 
society involves exploring the semantic history of the underlying reference 
problems that have served to shape communications about ethics. This means 
exploring the degree to which communications about ethics can be attributed to 
scientific, medical, legal or political understanding of the issues.  In taking 
informed consent as an example, communication on consent has increased at key 
moments.  We will argue that this appears to have occurred because of problems 
that different subsystems of society have had to confront. These happen at 
different times with differing consequences for ethical communication in these 
systems.  
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We would argue, following Luhamnn and others (Nassehi et al., 2008, Schirmer 
and Michalakis, 2011, Gibson and Burr, 2014), that there is no simple process of 
direct structural determination of one system on another, but that the 
relationship between these different forms of ethics communication is a product 
of the structural coupling between different systems.  However, before 
discussing the idea of structural coupling, we would like to give some examples 
of how ethical communication about informed consent has developed in the 
medical, legal and scientific systems as the result of distinct system dynamics.  
We want to illustrate that prior to the emergence of informed consent as a 
concept there are numerous interesting ideas that reveal much about ethical 
communication in the practice of medicine prior to the 20th Century.  
 
Ethical communication and Ǯǯ 
Whilst Hippocrates wrote of the importance of etiquette John Gregory in his Ǯǯ (1724 Ȃ 1773) and 
Percival, in Ǯǯ(Percival, 1803) are generally regarded as the first 
publications on the subject of medical ethics.  Both include a number of general 
reflections which suggest that morality is part of the esteem associated with 
being a gentleman when outlining the qualities of physicians.  Their 
pronouncements were designed to enable the conferment of esteem on medical 
practitioners. In association with these qualities Percival also talked about trust 
and the principle of beneficence, of doing no harm.   
 
The principle of doing no harm appears in the first code of ethics, the 1847 
American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics.  Article 4 states:   
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Ǯprognostications ǥ
the physician should be the minister of hope and comfort to the ǯ 
(American Medical Association, 1847). 
 
In other words, the physician should withhold the truth from her patients in the 
interests of doing no harm.   
 
The preliminary duties of the physician were also tied closely to the: ǮObligations 
of patients to their physiciansǯ.  Under article 6 it stated that Ǯobedience of a 
patient to the prescriptions of his physician should be prompt and implicit.  He 
should never permit his own crude opinions as to their fitness, to influence his ǯ (American Medical Association, 1847).  These 
communications reveal the conceptual history of what Parsons would later 
recognize as role reciprocity in the doctor patient relationship (Parsons, 1975; 
Gerhardt, 1989).   
 
It is not until 1849, when Hooker published ǮPhysician and Patientǯ (Hooker, 
1849), that we find a challenge to the notion that doctors should conceal the 
truth from patients. In Hooker we find the first attack on the medical profession 
for their apparent stance on truth telling. Hooker argued that: Ǯon that ǥwhether the truth shall in any case be withheld [italics in 
original] but whether, in doing this, real falsehood is ǯ  [italics added] 
(Katz, 1972 pg 360).   
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From the perspective of social systems theory this allows for second order 
observation so that an observer is able simultaneously to view both sides of the 
distinction truth revealed/truth not revealed as possibilities around which 
discussion about ethics can develop (Luhmann, 1995). This in turn allows an 
increase in the complexity of ethical communication. In this example truth telling 
could be both justified and unjustified and as constituting both benefit and harm, 
albeit under different conditions, which could be identified and discussed in 
further communications. The development of communications at the second 
order of observation with observers observing decision-makers increases the 
complexity of communications to reflect an ever-increasing complexity in the 
social environment (Luhmann, 1995). In what follows we discover how second 
order observation in medicine results in ethical communication and how the 
legal system was called upon to resolve the resulting complexities in medical 
ethics.  
 
Complexity and the emergence of informed consent in medicine 
Withholding the truth so as not to make gloomy prognostications was part of the 
generalized process of doing medicine. ǯǯǯpassively receive treatment.  
 
All this begins to change in 1767 when communication on consent in the legal 
system develops. In 1767 in England in the legal case Slater v. Baker and 
Stapleton Slater had hired Drs. Baker and Stapleton to remove bandages from a 
partially healed leg fracture. However, and with apparent disregard for Slǯ
protests, the doctors re-fractured his leg and placed it in an experimental 
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apparatus to reset. The judge stated that Ǯreasonable that a patient should be 
told what is about to be done to him, that he may take courage and put himself in 
such a situation as to enable him to ǯȏȐ (Slater 
v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 Ȃ Supreme Court 1767 Id. at 862).   
 
In this legal case we can see the beginning of a shift in medical practice away 
from treating patients as people who simply receive treatment determined by 
their physician, to one where people are permitted to participate, at least to 
some degree, in decisions about their treatment.  We note that the patient was 
nonetheless still the Ǯǯ as part of a process that 
involved deciphering and reading the physical body and the symptoms of 
pathology (Foucault, 1963).  
 
Whilst there are other legal cases raising issues about the role of the patient in 
decisions about their medical treatment, it is not until 1903 that there was the 
first of several key US legal cases in which consent was openly discussed. In the 
first of these, Rolater v Strain, the patient, Rolater, had consented to an operation 
to drain an infection in her foot, but had specifically requested that no bone was 
to be removed. The physician removed bone from her toe despite her instruction. 
The court held with the plantiff that the operation was not conducted in the 
manner consented to (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986 pg 123). The judge stated 
that the:  Ǯǡsed or implied, is necessary to 
authorize a physician to perform a surgical operation upon the body of 
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the patient. An operation without such coǯ
(Rolater v Strain 1913 OK 643: 1913: Oklahoma Supreme Court [02]). 
 
As we have seen prior to 1900 communication about ethics in medicine was Ǯlinical reaǯthe patient was a 
passive receptacle of pathology and treatment. A key reference problem in those 
communications involved the distinction between benefit and harm. This was 
often achieved by withholding the truth so as not to cause distress to the patient. 
Yet clearly there was a degree of legal conflict between telling the truth and 
concealment. In Rolater v Strain the distinction contains a very different 
reference problem. Action upon the body of another, without consent, was 
deemed to be unlawful. The court went on to state:  Ǯ ?ǡ--the 
right to the inviolability of his person, in other words, his right to himself-
-is the subǯ (Rolater v Strain 1913 OK 643: 
1913: Oklahoma Supreme Court [1]). 
 
We find here much more complex distinctions associated with the requirement 
of consent. These serve to furtheǮǯnotion of the patient as an active 
recipient of care.  To consent, a patient needs to be free, to have a sense of 
belonging as a citizen and possess a right to bodily integrity. We can recognize 
here changes in the underlying status of patient-hood that others have already 
highlighted (Foucault, 1963, Armstrong, 1984).  Armstrong argued that the 
meeting between the doctor and patient was no longer between the 
interrogating medical gaze and the passive patient but was in the process of 
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Ǯǯ(Armstrong, 1984). Throughout 
the development of ethical communication in medicine we can find further Ǯǯ. Each time that these Ǯǯappear we can observe the evolution of medical ethics and the effect 
of legal decisions on that evolution.  So, whilst the patient may begin to be 
treated as a more active agent in their medical treatment the catalyst for change 
appears to be legal decisions.   
 
To illustrate this process further we would like to discuss two other widely cited 
cases. The first is the 1914 US legal case Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospitals. 
Here the physician removed a fibroid tumor. The patient had only consented to 
being examined under anesthesia, specifically requesting not to have an 
operation (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986). The case eventually became widely ǯ-determination (Faden and 
Beauchamp, 1986 p. 123, Katz, 1972, Katz 1998) in which it was stated that: ǮEvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own [sic] bodyǯ(Schloendorff v. 
Society of N.Y. Hospitals. (105 N.E. 92) [4]). 
 
The Schloendorff Case is now considered perhaps the landmark case in 
pioneering Ǯ-determinaǯ in law.  It is here that consent 
became established as an important concept (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986). 
Closer analysis reveals an increase in complexity whereby the issue of consent 
becomes associated with age and soundness of mind.  This leaves the way open 
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for further communications as to how these concepts should be interpreted and 
applied within other systems, for example medicine.  
 
The second case is the 1957 a US case Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University 
Board of Trustees.  Here the physician had recommended an aortography to 
identify the location of a suspected obstructed abdominal aorta. The procedure 
would involve the injection of a dye and had not yet become routine procedure. 
Salgo, the patient, suffered permanent paralysis because of the intervention.  
Paralysis was a risk of such a procedure but in this case the physician had not 
warned the patient (Katz, 1998). This is widely acknowledged to be the first case Ǯǯ(Faden and Beauchamp, 1986). Here the 
judge stated: ǲOne is to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon any surgical 
procedure or operation, no matter how remote; this may well result in 
alarming ǥ
discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts 
necessary to an informed consentǤǳ [italics added] (Salgo v. Leland Stanford 
Jr. University Board of Trustees,154 Cal.App.2d [5b]).  
  
We would argue that these legal decisions acted as irritants for the evolution of 
the concept of consent in health and in rules and principles in medical ethics. Yet 
the communications in research have a different dynamic and subsequently 
different semantics.  
 
Principles of consent in research 
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Ethical communication concerning consent in research is closely related to 
historical controversies and as such developed different semantics that are 
closely related to science as the underlying reference problem. The 1947 
Nuremberg Code ǯ
during the Second World War and is considered a pivotal point in the history of 
consent in medical research (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986).  The Code consisted 
of ten principles approved by the tribunal for distinguishing between lawful and 
unlawful medical research on humans in response to the defense arguments at 
Nuremberg that Nazi doctors were not doing anything unlawful (Annas and 
Grodin 1992).  
 
The Nuremberg Code subsequently become established setting out the medical 
standards and principles for human experimentation (Grodin, 1992). It opens 
with an unequivocal statement of the status of consent in human 
experimentation:  Ǯthe person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be 
so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the 
intervention of any element of force ǥhould have sufficient 
knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter 
involved, as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened 
decisionǯ (The Nuremberg Code 1947). 
 
Faden and Beauchamp (1986) argued that the Nazi atrocities would have Ǯǯ
informed consent in human experimentation (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986 p 
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186).  However, they also state that the experiences in Germany appeared to 
have no major effect on informed consent in psychology and the social sciences. 
Articles in journals in personality and social psychology in 1948 suggested that 
18% had reported the use of deception, and this had increased to 38% by 1963 
(Faden and Beauchamp 1986 p 172). In 1953, four years after the Nuremberg 
Code, the American Psychological Society code of Ethics was published.  The 
reference to consent was as follows: ǮWhen a reasonable possibility of injurious after effects exists, research is 
conducted only when the subjects or their responsible agents are fully 
informed of this possibility and agree to participate nevǯ(Katz, 
1972 pg 315) 
 
Consent was only required if there was a likelihood of injury. The principle set 
out in social science did not follow the same form apparent in Nuremberg, where 
principles of consent drew distinctions between freedom/coercion, 
choice/coercion, information/lack of information.  
 
To further analyse how the principle of informed consent evolved in the social 
and behavioural sciences post Nuremburg we look to the first of a series of 
events in the social sciences beginning with the Wichita Jury Recording Case in 
1954. This involved a group of lawyers and social scientists, who recorded the 
deliberations of juries in six civil cases in the United States district of Wichita, 
Kansas. The jurors did not know that they were being recorded. The research 
became public knowledge and the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary held public hearings to assess the impact of the 
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Ǯ jury system [which is protected by] the ǯ(Katz, 1972 pg 67 insertion in the 
original). Ruebhausen and Brim (Ruebhausen and Brim, 1966) were key 
commentators at the time.  They stated that: ǮThe right to privacy is, therefore, a positive claim to the status of personal 
dignity Ȃ ǥThe essence of the claim to privacy is the 
choice of the individual as to what he shall disclose or withhold, and when 
he shall do so. Accordingly, the essential privacy-respecting ethic for ǯ
(Ruebhausen and Brim 1966 p 430). 
In this statement Ǯprivacyǯ as a concept developed in communication about 
consent and this was directly linked to personal dignity and freedom. This link 
was also evident in two further events which occurred.  This includes ǯ
research on obedience, first published in 1965 (Milgram, 1965).  The results 
suggested the conditions under which subjects transfer responsibility to 
authority and Milgram was criticized for using deception (Faden and Beauchamp, 
1986).  
 
The second event ǯaroom Trade (Humphreys, 1970).  This study 
also included deception and involved observation of sexual acts in public toilets 
followed by interviews where Humphreys disguised himself as a health service Ǥǯthe subjectsǯ 
right to privacy.  
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Here we have a communication in which distinctions between privacy and self-
determination, withholding information and consent are evident and different 
from those we have analyzed in medicine. The events in medicine and medical 
experimentation have paved the way for the emergence of consent in social and 
behavioral sciences but the principles associated with consent have different 
forms. ǯǮǯ
(Luhmann 1997 pg 76). The way this communication developed does not 
suggest a deterministic relationship. Rather what we have is a different set of 
reference problems leading to different underlying dynamics in social and 
medical science. This brings us to the concept of structural coupling and the 
relationships between the legal system, medicine and science. 
 
Structural coupling: consequences for informed consent  
The concept of Ǯstructural couplingǯ is the simultaneous co-evolution of 
communication systems in such a way that the communications of one become 
reconstituted within the other.  Structural coupling establishes specific 
mechanisms of irritation in systems, for example, property and contract are part 
of the legal system and these communications cause irritation in the legal system. 
The irritation means that the system has to respond to changes in its 
environment.  Given that we live in what Luhmann terms a functionally 
differentiated society it is no longer a requirement that function systems are 
compatible with each other.   
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Our analysis indicates the relevance of structural coupling between the legal 
system, medicine and science. The Nuremberg Code can be seen as 
communication emerging from the legal system which is structurally coupled 
with science. Consent therefore, is copied from one system to another, but what 
is interesting in our analysis is that the forms that this has taken are different 
according to the demands and requirement of different systems. The case of the 
Wichita Jury Recording Case in 1954 is a good example of how tǮǯ
occurred. The provision for consent in psychology was evident in our analysis 
prior to Wichita in the 1953 American Psychological Society Code of Ethics but Ǯǯ(Katz, 1972 p 
315). Reference to consent reflects Ǯǯ
communication about consent in other systems and it is perhaps not surprising 
that we see consent mentioned in behavioural science as a subsystem of science. ǡǯǡ
Humphries, that explicit communication media about consent to withhold 
personal information became apparent. These events are internal to 
psychological research and take a different form to the discussion on consent 
that we have analyzed in the systems of law, medicine and indeed, the sub 
systems of science.   
 
Additionally, the findings of this analysis direct our attention to important 
aspects of the development of ethical communication not covered by previous 
analyses. There has been an increase in communication about consent and 
ethical communication generally and we would like to suggest that this has much 
to do with the dynamics of a functionally differentiated society and the 
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developing semantics of individuality and personhood.  To understand this 
further we need to introduce how Luhmann explains the genealogy of modern 
functionally differentiated society which is central to his analysis of the human 
subject.  
 
The semantics of personhood and consent as a technology.  ǯevolutionary; he traced a genealogy from pre-modern 
society, where the individual was defined by its social position, protected by 
social bonds of religion and family, to a modern functionally differentiated 
society. He saw pre-modern societies as organized into equivalently structured 
subsystems, where people were defined by their inclusion in a social stratum or 
a household, and where there was relatively little interdependence 
(Verschraegen, 2002).  In modern society however, society is re-ogranised 
around forms of social function and interaction that cross cut social hierarchies 
(Luhmann 2012) and the position of the individual has become more 
problematic as the personality of the individual is no longer defined by fixed 
roles. With functional differentiation social positions no longer ǯs 
position in society.  RǮ-ǯǣǢ
a patient, a student and so forth, in a variety of partial inclusions and where no 
system allows for the integration of these different selves into a whole.  The 
semantics of individuality are a reaction to functional differentiation and 
conceive of the individual as standing outside of the social order. The semantics Ǯǯ
and inclusion. We think Moeller puts this very well when he argues that: Ǯ
shift of the semantics of individuality from social inclusion to the peculiar social 
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exclusion-ǲǳȋ2006 pg 88).  In this way, argues ǣǮǡǡ
preserve an illusion of innocence-equality as equal opportunity and freedom as 
allowing for inȋȌǯ(Luhmann 1997 pg70).  
And following Luhmann Moeller argues that tǮǯ to the 
restraints and inequalities caused by the partial inclusion of the individual by 
functional systems is human rights.   
 
Human rights emerge as a key moment in modernity in the move to a 
functionally differentiated society.  They are not viewed by Luhmann as 
universal absolutes celebrating and defending the intrinsic worth of the 
individual but as depending upon the internal operations of function systems 
and the ability of the individual to access these systemsǤǮǯ
challenged in the sysǡǯ
own interpretation and implementations of rights.  What evolves, for Luhmann, 
is not progress to more individual freedom, more respect for personhood, and so 
forth, but rather the ways in which people are constructed as historically 
contingent ǯǤThese ideas, as ǡǡǮ
sense of our social existence Ȃ ǯȋ
2006 pg 95).  
 
We are arguing that communication on consent has evolved with the increased 
differentiation of society and the developing semantics of individuality and 
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personhood.  At the same time, communication on informed consent has also Ǯǯȋ1993 pg 1003).  
 
Technology has a specific definition in Luhmann which we argue fits with 
informed consent as Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
Luhmann argues that early understanding of technology incorporated the 
application of knowledge about nature to human ends. This association has 
traditionally set up the opposition between technology and humanity and the 
characterisation of technology as the source of Ǯǯ
(Luhmann 2012 pg 315).  In contrast, Luhmann argues that this understanding is 
obsolete.  His example in his book Risk (1993) is that of commercially produced 
organic potatoes which are no more Ǯǯ
modified ones.  So, rather than the distinction between technology and human, 
Luhmann argues the distinction in technology is between controllable and 
uncontrollable and the reduction of complexity.  
 
Technology operates to make possible the coupling of heterogeneous elements 
and Ǯǯ
(Luhmann 2013 pg 243). It allows the coupling of completely heterogeneous 
elements in a reliably repeatable manner, the advantages of which include:  Ǯ-be they in design or in operation; the 
limitability of input to what is needed, thus the planability and 
rationalizability of resource allocation; and, finally and above all, a certain 
degree of intrasystemic control over external relations that the system 
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sees, with the conversion of risks of differentiation into risks of ǯȋ ? ? ?ȌǤ 
In other words, technology operates to isolate and close off operations from 
external influences so that they can repetitively and predictably perform as they 
should with the predicted outcome.  We argue the informed consent operate like 
this and alleviate the burden of causal forces which are excluded from decision 
making processes.  
 
Herein however, lies the paradox of informed consent; it has evolved in response 
to complexity, differentiation and the developing semantics of individuality and 
personhood but nonetheless, it operates to exclude all these things in the process 
of obtaining it. It is a functional simplification in which the complexity of the 
world is reconstructed as a simplified set of causal relations.  
 
Conclusion 
Through our semantic analysis of communication on informed consent we have 
argued that this concept has evolved through increased complexity in 
communication in medicine, legal and science communications. There is no 
simple process of direct structural determination of one system on another.  
Structural coupling between systems results in informed consent taking different 
forms according to the demands and requirements of different systems.   
 
Ultimately, increased functional differentiation and the transformation of legal 
communications, have evolved into principles commonly recognized in research 
ethics codes of practice and principles.  In most regards however, there is little, if 
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anything, that is ethical or moral in the communication we have analysed.  
Rather we would argue that the increase in communication about consent has 
more to do with the dynamics of a functionally differentiated society and the 
evolving semantics of personhood rather than reflecting our intrinsic worth as 
individuals.  Following Luhmann, our worth, such as it is, is an historically ǯǤ In this 
regard, the criticisms we opened our discussion with are particularly pertinent.  
As Corrigan (2003) argued, the concept of consent is empty but not, we would 
argue, for the reasons she identified.  It is empty because our worth as 
autonomous individuals is empty.   
 
The process of informed consent, we argue, is essentially a technology in the 
Luhmannian sense.  It reduces the complex, it guarantees that operations can be 
repeated, it excludes the individual Ǯalways difficult and conflictual ǯ(Luhmann pg 313). It is a standardized and 
closed process designed to produce predictability in an otherwise contingent 
world.  
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